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ABSTRACT 
By most standards, Britain in the 19
th
 century was the leading financial nation in the world, 
possessing more developed capital markets than any other country. An influential view in the 
law and finance literature argues that holding macroeconomic factors constant, this difference 
in financial development can be attributed to more stringent disclosure regulation in Britain. 
This article compares Britain with another European country that was at the centre of the 
industrial transformation in the 19
th
 century: Germany. It presents a more granular analysis of 
regulatory reform than is available elsewhere in the literature and presents findings that are, in 
several respects, at variance with the orthodox view in law and finance. The level of 
disclosure regulation was largely comparable in both countries during the period under 
investigation. Furthermore, reform of disclosure regulation was not an exogenous stimulus of 
financial development, but evolved incrementally and in response to changing market 
conditions. This was different with respect to the legal regime governing the formation of 
stock corporations. Here, the two countries developed in diametrically opposed directions as a 
result of concerted efforts by the policy maker to effect changes in market conditions. The 
article argues that these rules stand out as the most striking difference between Germany and 
the UK, a difference that was relevant to organisational choice and types of finance available 
to the entrepreneur. 
 
 
Keywords: Law and finance; financial development; disclosure regulation; private 
enforcement; liability for incorrect disclosures  
                                                     
*
 Law Department, London School of Economics and Political Science. I am grateful to John Armour, 
Markus Baltzer, Theodor Baums, Klaus J. Hopt, David Kershaw, Gerhard Kling, Michael Lobban, Eva 
Micheler, Federico Mucciarelli, Wolf-Georg Ringe, the anonymous reviewers of the Modern Law 
Review, and the participants of conferences and seminars at the University of Bonn, Chinese 
University of Hong Kong, London School of Economics, SOAS, and the University of Warwick for 
valuable comments. All mistakes are mine. 
2 
 
INTRODUCTION 
A perennial concern of policy makers around the world is the construction of a framework of 
financial regulation that is effective, efficient, and—most importantly—conducive to the 
emergence of deep and liquid financial market. While the channels through which financial 
development influences economic growth are not yet fully understood, there is broad 
agreement that developed financial markets are instrumental in fostering economic growth.
1
 
Thus, the importance of regulatory design for the prosperity of nations can hardly be 
overestimated.  
Essential ingredients of any regulatory regime governing the capital markets are rules 
mandating the disclosure of financial information, both transaction-specific and ongoing, and 
liability rules that allow investors to recover losses from those who are responsible for 
misstatements to the market. Legal institutions requiring, for example, the disclosure of the 
company’s annual accounts and the publication of an offering prospectus containing 
particulars of the company and the securities to be offered to the public were formulated, for 
the first time, in the 19
th
 century. This period saw the transformation of largely agrarian 
economies to industrial ones, first in Western Europe and then in the United States. With it 
came the mobilization of capital, expansion of the banking system, and increased use of the 
capital markets as a means of financing industrial enterprises.
2
 
One country was ahead of all other industrialising nations in terms of financial development 
over the course of the 19
th
 century: Great Britain. The number of joint stock companies 
incorporated in Britain was seven to eight times higher and their paid-up capital three to four 
times larger than in the next largest economies on the Continent,
3
 and the London Stock 
Exchange was the leading exchange in the world, with a deeper and more liquid market than 
anywhere else.
4
 The different financial trajectory is particularly astonishing when compared 
                                                     
1
 The first in-depth consideration of the nexus of finance and economic growth is commonly attributed 
to Joseph Schumpeter, The Theory of Economic Development: An Inquiry into Profits, Capital, Credit, 
Interest, and the Business Cycle (Harvard University Press, 1911). For two more recent contributions 
providing empirical evidence see Robert G. King and Ross Levine, ‘Finance and Growth: Schumpeter 
Might Be Right’ (1993) 108 Q. J. Econ. 717; Raghuram G. Rajan and Luigi Zingales, Financial 
Dependence and Growth’ (1998) 88 Am. Econ. Rev. 559. 
2
 Caroline Fohlin, Mobilizing Money (CUP, 2012) 15-47. 
3
 In 1906, 40,995 joint-stock companies with a combined paid-up capital of £2,000 million were 
incorporated in Britain, compared with 5,061 companies with a paid-up capital of £685 million in 
Germany (also 1906) and 6,325 companies with a paid-up capital of £540 million in France (1898), see 
Ranald Michie, ‘Different in name only? The London Stock Exchange and foreign bourses, c. 1850-
1914’ (1988) 30 Business History 46, 52. 
4
 Ranald Michie, The London Stock Exchange: A History (OUP, 2001) 70-73. For comparative data on 
stock market capitalisation and the number of listed companies per million people see also Raghuram 
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with another European economy that was rapidly growing in the latter half of the 19
th
 century 
and overtook Britain as the leading industrial powerhouse of Europe by the early 20
th
 century: 
Germany. In spite of the fact that Germany was home to a considerable number of expanding 
industrial corporations, available comparative data show consistently that, until the eve of 
World War I, Germany’s financial markets lagged behind those in Britain in respect of almost 
every measure of financial development: number of incorporated firms, number of listed 
firms, volume of securities issues, stock market capitalization as a percentage of gross 
domestic product, and financial assets as a proportion of national assets.
5
 
One explanation of these striking differences in financial development, often advanced in the 
law and finance literature, is epitomised by the following quote: 
“Disclosure legislation by the end of the nineteenth century armed British 
investors … with the best information possessed by investors anywhere. We 
consider this to be a reason, possibly a major reason … why the British 
capital markets were the world leaders in the same era.”6 
The central role for financial development that this view attributes to disclosure regulation, 
and more generally to investor protection laws as promulgated in common law countries, has 
been challenged by a number of studies that have forcefully argued that investor protection in 
19
th
 century Britain was not substantial.
7
 However, both sides in the debate focus generally 
                                                                                                                                                        
G. Rajan and Luigi Zingales, ‘The Great Reversals: The Politics of Financial Development in the 20th 
Century’ (2003) 69 J. Fin. Econ. 5, 15. 
5
 For data on Germany, see Deutsche Bundesbank, Deutsches Geld- und Bankwesen in Zahlen, 1876-
1975 (Knapp, 1975), 287-296; Richard van der Borght, Statistische Studien über die Bewährung der 
Actiengesellschaften (Gustav Fischer, 1883); Ernst Engel, ‘Die erwerbsthätigen juristischen Personen 
im preussischen Staate, insbesondere die Actiengesellschaften’ (1875) 15 Zeitschrift des Königlich 
Preussischen Statistischen Bureaus 449. Annual information on listings on the London Stock Exchange 
are contained in Burdett’s Official Intelligence of Securities (Couchman, from 1882), later renamed 
Stock Exchange Official Intelligence. Sources presenting comparative data include George W 
Edwards, The Evolution of Finance Capitalism (Longmans, 1938) 392-393, 404-405; Raymond W 
Goldsmith, Comparative National Balance Sheets: a Study of Twenty Countries 1688-1978 (University 
of Chicago Press, 1985) 221-226; Leslie Hannah, ‘The “Divorce” of Ownership from Control from 
1900 Onwards: Re-calibrating Imagined Global Trends’ (2007) 49 Business History 404, 406; Alfred 
Neymarck, ‘La statistique internationale des valeurs mobilières’ (1915) 56 Journal de la Société 
Française de Statistique 353, 360-366. 
6
 Richard Sylla and George David Smith, ‘Information and Capital Market Regulation in Anglo-
American Finance’ in Michael D Bordo and Richard Sylla (eds.), Anglo-American Financial Systems: 
Institutions and Markets in the Twentieth Century (Irwin, 1995) 179. Similar views are expressed in the 
well-known studies of Rafael La Porta, Florencio Lopez-de-Silanes, Andrei Shleifer, and Robert 
Vishny (LLSV), e.g. LLSV, ‘Legal determinants of external finance’ (1997) 52 J. Fin. 1131; Rafael La 
Porta, Florencio Lopez-de-Silanes, and Andrei Shleifer, ‘The Economic Consequences of Legal 
Origins’ (2008) 46 J. Econ. Lit. 285. 
7
 Graeme G Acheson et al., ‘Corporate ownership and control in Victorian Britain’ (2015) 68 Economic 
History Review 911; Brian R Cheffins, ‘Does Law Matter? The Separation of Ownership and Control 
in the United Kingdom’ (2001) 30 Journal of Legal Studies 459; Brian R Cheffins, Corporate 
Ownership and Control: British Business Transformed (OUP 2008), 194-197; Julian Franks, Colin 
Mayer and Stefano Rossi, ‘Ownership: Evolution and Regulation’ (2009) 22 Rev. Finan. Stud. 4009. 
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only on major legislative reforms and do not map the evolution of disclosure regulation at a 
granular level and by comparing key legal systems, such as Britain and Germany. In addition, 
they do not consider other aspects of a country’s legal system that potentially facilitate or 
stymie the access of entrepreneurs to capital markets in order to raise finance from public 
investors, notably the ease with which companies can be incorporated.
8
 
This article contributes to the debate in two ways. First, it examines the evolving disclosure 
framework, as well as the evolution of legal institutions imposing liability for incorrect 
disclosures to the market, during the formative stages of the capital markets in Europe—the 
19
th
 century. Even though the regulatory framework was incomplete by modern standards, 
legal concepts such as prospectus disclosure or liability for incorrect statements to the market 
that continue to constitute essential building blocks of securities regulation to this day began 
to emerge in a fairly well-defined form as early as the second half of the 19
th
 century. By 
analysing primary and secondary legal sources, including court decisions, parliamentary 
records, and contemporary contributions from legal academia, the article explores the 
interdependence between legal reform and stock market development.
9
 It discusses how 
changing economic conditions influenced legislative reform and the interpretation of 
traditional common law concepts by the courts, resulting in an incremental and endogenous 
evolution of disclosure regulation in both the United Kingdom and Germany. In the two 
countries, policy makers and the courts found similar answers to the lack of transparency and 
misinformation of the public that characterised the early capital markets, and it is difficult to 
argue that one system was clearly superior to the other in the protection it offered investors. 
Second, the article highlights the fundamentally different approach in the two countries to the 
basic structural setup of corporations and the conditions that had to be satisfied for their 
                                                     
8
 Arguably, Britain’s comparative advantage in facilitating access to equity capital cannot be explained 
with the ‘maturity’ of the financial markets, i.e. the experience and rational behaviour of investors and 
other market actors. Financial crises occurred both in Germany and the UK in the second half of the 
19
th
 century and the London stock market was by no means free from market imperfections, see Philip 
L Cottrell, ‘Domestic finance, 1860-1914’ in Roderick Floud and Paul Johnson (eds.), The Cambridge 
Economic History of Modern Britain, vol. 2 (CUP, 2004), 253, 277-279. 
9
 A number of studies in finance and economics analyse the wider economic and regulatory landscape 
in 19
th
 century Germany to assess the effect of changing legal and non-legal conditions on ownership 
structure and financing patterns. See, for example, Carsten Burhop, David Chambers and Brian R 
Cheffins, ‘Law, Politics and the Rise and Fall of German Stock Market Development, 1870-1938’ 
(2015) ECGI Law Working Paper No. 283/2015; Caroline Fohlin, ‘The History of Corporate 
Ownership and Control in Germany’ in Randall K Morck (ed.), A History of Corporate Governance 
around the World: Family Business Groups to Professional Managers (University of Chicago Press, 
2005), 223 [hereinafter Fohlin, ‘History’]; Caroline Fohlin, Finance Capitalism and Germany’s Rise to 
Industrial Power (CUP, 2007), in particular 15-47; Julian Franks, Colin Mayer and Hannes F Wagner, 
‘The Origins of the German Corporation – Finance, Ownership and Control’ (2006) 10 Rev. Fin. 537. 
However, again, these studies do not provide for a detailed analysis of the applicable legal 
environment. 
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formation. As opposed to disclosure regulation, these rules did not evolve incrementally, but 
in fits and starts, with wide-ranging liberalisation in the 1840s in the United Kingdom and in 
the 1870s in Germany, and less than two decades later a substantial reversion to a more 
paternalistic regime that effectively excluded large sections of the population from the capital 
markets in Germany, but not in the United Kingdom. These reforms had a well-documented 
effect on economic concentration
10
 and the choice of organisational form by German 
entrepreneurs,
11
 but they have received virtually no consideration in the law and finance 
literature. 
The article, therefore, fills a gap in the literature by providing a detailed comparative analysis 
of important building blocks of the legal environment pertaining to the corporate economy 
during a period that saw the contemporaneous emergence of liquid capital markets and 
modern concepts of securities regulation. The analysis allows us to identify where German 
and English law differed, and where the regulatory regime was similar and therefore has little 
power in explaining the different trajectories of financial development. At the same time, it is 
important to recognise the limitations of the analysis. In order to come to robust conclusions 
regarding the causal effect of the legal institutions examined here on the development of 
financial markets, it would be necessary to control for all potentially relevant explanatory 
variables, including economic variables such as the more or less capital-intensive nature of 
the industries seeking to raise finance at different stages of industrialisation
12
 or the 
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 Franks, Mayer and Wagner, n 9 above, 538; Norbert Reich, ‘Auswirkungen der deutschen 
Aktienrechtsreform von 1884 auf die Konzentration der deutschen Wirtschaft’ in Norbert Horn and 
Jürgen Kocka (eds.), Law and the Formation of the Big Enterprises in the 19
th
 and Early 20
th
 Centuries 
(Vandenhoeck & Ruprecht, 1979), 255, 263-265. 
11
 Timothy Guinnane et al., ‘Putting the Corporation in its Place’ (2007) 8 Enterprise & Society 687, 
702 (tracing the organisational choices between public corporations, partnerships limited by shares, 
private limited companies, limited partnerships, and general partnerships in Prussia from 1867-1932, 
and showing that the formation of public corporations as a percentage of all newly established firms 
increased with the liberalising reforms of 1870 and decreased with the restrictive later reforms, which 
date from 1884). 
12
 For example, according to the so-called Gerschenkron hypothesis, the reason for the dominance of 
bank financing in Germany, rather than the raising of funds in capital markets, is seen in the position of 
the German economy as a relative latecomer among industrializing nations (or, to put it differently, in 
Germany’s moderate economic backwardness at the time). Industrialization, it is argued, unfolded 
rapidly in Germany because companies were able to adopt technologies that had already been 
developed elsewhere. However, rapid expansion and technological transformation required vast sums 
of money that could not easily be mobilized except by large, financially powerful banks. In first-mover 
countries such as the UK that experienced more incremental industrialization, on the other hand, it was 
possible to finance industrial development through the reinvestment of profits and the offering of 
shares to the public, including to small savers. The Gerschenkron hypothesis goes back to the work of 
Alexander Gerschenkron, in particular his books Economic Backwardness in Historical Perspective 
(Harvard University Press 1962) and Continuity in History and Other Essays (Harvard University Press 
1968). For an overview of the literature discussing Gerschenkron hypothesis, see Caroline Fohlin, 
‘Universal Banking in Pre-World War I Germany: Model or Myth?’ (1999) 36 Explorations in 
Economic History 305, 307-314. 
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availability of bank finance.
13
 These questions are beyond the scope of this article. Thus, the 
article can be seen as a stepping stone towards a broader research agenda in law and finance 
that acknowledges the role of both disclosure regulation and formation law and embraces a 
granular analysis of legal institutions that reveals how they evolve: incrementally and in 
response to changing market conditions, or as a concerted effort of the policy maker to effect 
changes in market conditions. 
The remainder of this article is structured as follows. The next section analyses the evolution 
of disclosure regulation in Germany and the United Kingdom, focussing on the two most 
important items of disclosure in the 19
th
 century, the company’s financial accounts and the 
offering prospectus. Section II examines the development of mechanisms to enforce 
disclosure obligations, which consisted, in the absence of a strong public regulator of the 
financial markets,
14
 primarily in litigation by investors who claimed that they had bought 
shares in reliance on incorrect information. We will see that the courts were ingenious in 
utilising and modifying common law concepts predating the emergence of capital markets 
under the impression of changing conceptions of the function of disclosure and the shift from 
face-to-face transactions to trading in public markets. Section III shows that, as opposed to 
disclosure regulation, which evolved similarly in Germany and the United Kingdom, the 
German legislator took the decision to reform company law fundamentally in 1884 in 
response to the first major stock exchange crash in Germany, making the formation of joint 
stock companies significantly more costly than in the United Kingdom. The more stringent 
formation regime, together with a high minimum nominal share value, was explicitly seen as 
a—somewhat crude—investor protection device, because it made investing in shares 
unattractive for all but the most affluent and experienced investors. I conclude by arguing that 
formation law, rather than disclosure regulation, stands out as the most striking difference 
between Germany and the United Kingdom during the formative stages of financial 
development, a difference that was relevant to organisational choice and types of finance 
available to the entrepreneur. 
                                                     
13
 It has been argued that banking institutions in the UK neglected financing the domestic industry and 
instead focused on other types of investment to deploy their capital, notably foreign business ventures, 
Bernard Elbaum and William Lazonick, ‘The Decline of the British Economy: An Institutional 
Perspective’ (1984) 44 Journal of Economic History 567, 570. 
14
 Public enforcement was generally limited to the supervision of the operations of stock exchanges by 
a state commissioner (see, for example, the German Stock Exchange Act [Börsengesetz] of 22 June 
1896, RGBl. 1896, p. 157, s. 2), unless the stock exchange was set up as a self-regulatory organization, 
Michie, n 4 above, 35. 
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EXPERIMENTS IN ECONOMIC LIBERALISM: DISCLOSURE REGULATION 
Disclosure has long been seen by regulators and policy makers as one of the cornerstones of 
modern securities regulation. Today, it seems to be widely accepted that some form of 
mandatory disclosure, enabling potential investors to make informed decisions, plays an 
important role in allocating capital to productive uses and supporting the stability of financial 
markets.
15
 In the 19
th
 century, regulation took the first, albeit often hesitant, steps towards 
developing this disclosure paradigm. 
Germany 
The regulatory environment in early 19
th
 century Germany was fragmentary. While it was 
common for corporations to publish prospectuses describing the company’s objects in order 
to attract investors, the law did not provide for any specific requirements regarding the form 
of such prospectuses. In one of the first German-language monographs dealing with the law 
of the joint stock corporation, the author defined a public offering prospectus as ‘the 
announcement of the business project’.16 The legal qualification of prospectuses was not (yet) 
informed by any disclosure rationale, but centred on the question of whether the 
announcement was sufficiently certain and detailed to be capable of giving rise to contractual 
obligations. Insofar as the prospectus contained information about the objects and constitution 
of the company, the founders were bound by the disclosed facts in relation to subscribers for 
the company’s shares. The binding effect of the prospectus encompassed ‘all material facts … 
all aspects which must be assumed to have influenced the decision of those who invested in 
the company as a result of the published prospectus.’17 It was clear that the prospectus had to 
be analysed through a contractual lens. If statements were important for the investor’s 
decision, they became ‘material elements’ of the subscription agreement, and those who were 
parties to the agreement could be held liable if the statements were incorrect. Outside the 
circle of persons bound by contract or quasi-contract, and where the prospectus contained 
                                                     
15
 From the literature, see, e.g., John C Coffee, ‘Market Failure and the Economic Case for a 
Mandatory Disclosure System’ 70 Va. L. Rev. 717 (1984); Allen Ferrell ‘The Case for Mandatory 
Disclosure in Securities Regulation Around the World’ (2007) 2 Brook. J. Corp. Fin. & Com. L. 81. 
However, in spite of the almost universal agreement by policy makers, the mandatory disclosure 
paradigm continues to attract academic criticism, see Omri Ben-Shahar and Carl E Schneider, ‘The 
Failure of Mandated Disclosure’ (2011) 159 U. Pa. L. Rev. 647. 
16
 Meno Pöhls, Das Recht der Actiengesellschaften (Hoffmann und Campe 1842), 20. A similar 
interpretation can still be found after the abolishment of the concession system in 1870, Achilles 
Renaud, Das Recht der Actiengesellschaften (2nd ed., Tauchnitz, 1875), 217 (referring to Pöhls). 
17
 Pöhls, n 17 above, 155. 
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only general statements, it did not entail any legally binding effects.
18
 Likewise, given that the 
prospectus was seen as falling within the realm of contract and not as a tool to ensure market 
transparency, it is not surprising that the law during the early years of German capital markets 
did not specify any minimum content or, in fact, require the publication of a prospectus. The 
only disclosure obligation contained in early laws, for example in the Prussian Stock 
Corporation Act of 1843, was the requirement to file the articles of association, which were 
then published in the official gazette.
19
 
German corporate law was transformed from a state concession system to a system providing 
for incorporation by registration in 1870.
20
 The German legislator acknowledged that a 
concession system was not only incapable of protecting the public effectively, but was prone 
to increasing the risks for investors by giving them a false sense of confidence in the 
prospects of the business and thus encouraging imprudent investment behaviour. The only 
viable solution, it was argued, was reliance on the investors’ own vigilance and care in 
making investments.
21
 However, the Companies Act of 1870, arguably, only embraced one 
                                                     
18
 Ibid. 155-158. It required some ingenuity on the part of the courts to overcome this purely 
contractual conception of prospectuses, see the discussion below, text to notes 77-84. 
19
 Gesetz über die Aktiengesellschaften, Gesetz-Sammlung für die Königlich-Preußischen Staaten 
[Collection of Laws of the Royal Prussian State] 1843, p. 341, ss. 2-3. 
20
 The new system was introduced for the states of the North German Confederation, which included 
Prussia, in Art. 211 Allgemeines Deutsches Handelsgesetzbuch (ADHGB) [General German 
Commercial Code], as amended by Gesetz, betreffend die Kommanditgesellschaften auf Aktien und 
die Aktiengesellschaften [Act Concerning Limited Partnerships by Shares and Joint Stock 
Corporations], BGBl. Norddt. Bund [Federal Law Gazette of the North German Confederation] 1870, 
p. 375. Some German states, in particular the Hanseatic cities of Bremen, Hamburg, and Lübeck, but 
also Württemberg and Saxony, abolished the concession system earlier than 1870, making use of the 
authority under art. 249 General German Commercial Code of 1861. For a full list of the respective 
state laws, see Stenographische Berichte über die Verhandlungen des Reichstages des Norddeutschen 
Bundes, I. Legislatur-Periode, Session 1870 [Stenographic protocols of the proceedings of the 
Reichstag of the North German Confederation, 1
st
 parliamentary term, session 1870], vol. 4, document 
no. 158, pp. 645, 649-650. 
21
 Ibid. 650. These reasons were similar to those advanced by policy makers in other jurisdictions 
transitioning to incorporation by registration. See, for example, the speech by Robert Lowe, one of the 
main authors of company law reform in the mid-19
th
 century, Hansard, 3
rd
 Series, vol. 140 (1856), pp. 
116-138. Lowe pointed out that the 1844 Act (and the Limited Liability Act 1855, 18 & 19 Vict., c. 
133), ‘so far from having been a means of preventing fraud, have only afforded facilities for its 
commission, because fraudulent persons have availed themselves of the sort of prestige which is gained 
among ignorant people by a presumed association with the Government, and have announced 
companies as “provisionally registered,” and have thus given them a colour of respectability which 
their own merits would not obtain. It therefore appears to me that when the Government attempt, by a 
system of artificial restraints, to test the worth of any commercial undertaking, they endeavour to do 
what they are not able to accomplish.’ Ibid. 123. Instead, according to Lowe, any legislation should be 
based on the principles of freedom of incorporation and caveat emptor: ‘I am arguing in favour of 
human liberty—that people may be permitted to deal how and with whom they choose, without the 
officious interference of the State … [I]n my judgment, the principle we should adopt is this,—not to 
throw the slightest obstacle in the way of limited companies being formed—because the effect of that 
would be to arrest ninety-nine good schemes in order that the bad hundredth might be prevented; but to 
allow them all to come into existence, and when difficulties arise to arm the courts of justice with 
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aspect of disclosure, the periodic publication of the company’s books and accounts, and not 
transaction-specific disclosure triggered by accessing public capital markets. Even the former 
type of disclosure was not fashioned in a particularly stringent manner. The management 
board was required to draw up a balance sheet, which had to be presented to the shareholders 
and published in the official gazette.
22
 The act also contained some relatively basic provisions 
on the form of the accounts
23
 and criminal sanctions in case the directors misrepresented the 
financial position of the company,
24
 but prospectus disclosure was not mentioned. 
After the reforms of 1870, the number of incorporations increased dramatically. In the 
decades before 1870, joint stock corporations numbered not more than a few hundred in the 
most industrialized states of Germany, with railways attracting most of the financing,
25
 
whereas in the years 1870 (after the reforms entered into force in June) to 1874 alone, 857 
companies were incorporated nationwide and railways were quickly replaced by industrial 
corporations as the most important issuers of equity.
26
 
The laissez-faire regulation, arguably, contributed to the first major stock exchange crash in 
German history, the so-called ‘founders’ crash’ (Gründerkrach) in 1873.27 In the years before 
the crash, issuers had succeeded in placing securities with only minimal information about the 
                                                                                                                                                        
sufficient powers to check extravagance or roguery in the management of companies, and to save them 
from the wreck in which they may be involved. That is the only way in which the Legislature should 
interfere, with the single exception—a very essential one—of giving the greatest publicity to the affairs 
of such companies, that everyone may know on what grounds he is dealing.’ Ibid. 131. The German 
policy makers were well aware of the legal developments in the UK (and also in France and Italy) and 
did indeed refer to them to justify the German reforms, see for example Stenographic protocols, n 20 
above, 651-652. 
22
 Act of 1870, art. 239. 
23
 Ibid. art. 239a. 
24
 Ibid. art. 249. 
25
 For Prussia, see for example Jakob Riesser, Die deutschen Großbanken und ihre Konzentration im 
Zusammenhang mit der Entwicklung der Gesamtwirtschaft in Deutschland (4
th
 ed., G. Fischer 1912), 
35, 43 (counting 102 stock corporations with an aggregate capital of c. 638 million marks that were 
founded from 1826-1850 and 295 stock corporations with an aggregate capital of c. 2,405 million 
marks from 1851-1870; of the invested capital, 72% was raised by railways); Alfred Reckendrees, ‘Zur 
Funktion der Aktiengesellschaft in der frühen Industrialisierung’ (2012) 53 Jahrbuch für 
Wirtschaftsgeschichte 137, 147-153 (analysing incorporations in Prussia in the period 1770-1869); 
Horst Thieme, ‘Statistische Materialien zur Konzessionierung von Aktiengesellschaften in Preussen’ 
(1960) 1 Jahrbuch für Wirtschaftsgeschichte 285, 286 (showing that the annual number of 
incorporations, not including railways and turnpikes, ranged between 1 and 31 during the period 1770-
1867). For data on the capital of companies incorporated from 1800-1850, distinguishing between 
banks and trading companies, insurance undertakings, railways, other transportation companies, mining 
companies, and industrial corporations, see also Kurt Bösselmann, Die Entwicklung des deutschen 
Aktienwesens im 19. Jahrhundert (De Gruyter 1939), 199-200. 
26
 The companies had an aggregate capital of c. 3.31 billion marks, see Riesser, n 25 above, 105-106. 
27
 A vivid account of the founders’ crash is given by Albert Schäffle, ‘Der “grosse Börsenkrach” des 
Jahres 1873’ (1874) 30 Zeitschrift für die gesamte Staatswissenschaft 1. 
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business, often simply by publishing an announcement in a newspaper and greatly 
exaggerating the prospects of the business.
28
 The atmosphere was characterised by a veritable 
speculative frenzy, which was fuelled by underwriters manipulating stock prices or presenting 
offerings incorrectly as oversubscribed in order to place the securities they had underwritten 
more easily.
29
 When exogenous shocks
30
 disturbed the confidence of investors, it became 
clear that the stock market rally was not sustainable. Investors realised that many companies 
had been incorporated merely with a view to raising funds for the promoters, without having a 
viable business model. The resulting crash triggered the insolvency of a large number of 
financial institutions and listed companies; the market capitalisation of German stock 
corporations decreased by about 46% and the real economy suffered considerably.
31
 
The crash elicited a (somewhat belated) regulatory response in the form of a major overhaul 
of corporate law in 1884.
32
 However, this reform did not focus on strengthening the existing 
disclosure regime, but rather on tightening the rules on the formation of joint stock 
companies, which will be discussed below.
33
 To some extent, the lacuna in disclosure 
regulation was filled by the rules and regulations of the stock exchanges adopted since the 
1880s, which required the publication of a prospectus before securities could be admitted to 
trading. The regulations specified in detail the content of the prospectus by providing for 
different regimes depending on the type of issuer and security.
34
 For example, for shares of 
domestic industrial corporations, the prospectus had to contain information about the articles 
of association, objects, domicile and duration of the company, legal capital and amount of 
shares to be issued, rights attached to the shares, including pre-emptive rights and dividend 
rights, contributions in kind and payments made or other benefits granted in relation to the 
formation of the company, applicable accounting principles and principles on dividend 
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 Rainer Gömmel, ‘Entstehung und Entwicklung der Effektenbörsen im 19. Jahrhundert bis 1914’ in 
Hans Pohl (ed.), Deutsche Börsengeschichte (Fritz Knapp 1992), 153-155. 
29
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distribution, and the names of the members of the management and supervisory boards. In 
addition, the company’s articles and the last annual report had to be appended to the 
application.
35
 This regulatory framework remained largely unaltered until the end of the 
period here under investigation.
36
 
United Kingdom 
In the UK, disclosure became a central element of company law when the Joint Stock 
Companies Act of 1844
37
 replaced the concession system with a liberal system of 
incorporation by registration. The 1844 Act, informed by the conviction of its primary author, 
William Gladstone, that publicity was ‘the most effectual remedy’ in that it brought ‘the 
power of public opinion to bear on the proceedings of joint-stock companies’,38 required for 
incorporation only the filing of a list of particulars with the registrar of companies that 
included information on the name, purpose, and principal place of business of the company, 
its promoters, officers, and subscribers, and a copy of every prospectus or other statement 
addressed to the public with a view to issuing and allotting the company’s shares.39 The latter 
requirement is noteworthy for its wide scope, applying to any ‘prospectus or circular, handbill 
or advertisement, or other such document at any time addressed to the public, or to the 
subscribers or others, relative to the formation or modification of [the] company’.40 Thus, the 
legislator intended to establish control over any form of communication with the public that 
could potentially influence the investors’ decision to subscribe for securities. This stands in 
contrast to the approach in many other countries, where the obligation to disclose and file a 
prospectus is only triggered if an ‘offer’ is made to the public, defined as a communication 
that already contains relatively concrete information about the securities and the terms of the 
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36
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40
 Ibid. s. 4, no. 8. 
12 
 
offering,
41
 or, as initially in Germany, where the issuer seeks to obtain a stock exchange 
listing. On the other hand, the 1844 Act fell short of the standards set by most modern 
disclosure regimes in that it did not specify a particular content of the prospectus. 
The disclosure obligations upon the formation of companies were supplemented by detailed, 
mandatory rules on the drawing-up, auditing, and disclosure of the company’s financial 
accounts.
42
 The directors were responsible for producing periodical accounts and balance 
sheets, which had to be audited by external auditors appointed by the annual general meeting. 
Printed copies of the balance sheet and auditors report were sent to all shareholders before the 
ordinary general meeting, read at the meeting, and filed with the registrar of companies. 
Only a few years later, the ambitious disclosure regime of the 1844 Act, however, started to 
be hollowed out. The first step towards a liberal regime characterised by light-touch 
regulation and limited intervention in the workings of companies came with the Joint Stock 
Companies Act 1847, which repealed the registration requirement for prospectuses because it 
was ‘found to be very burdensome to the Promoters’.43 The only remaining restriction on the 
use of prospectuses was the prohibition to publish any prospectus or other document 
addressed to the public containing information that had to be filed with the registrar of 
companies before the required particulars were so filed, or statements that were at variance 
with the particulars previously filed.
44
 Then, in 1856, an act consolidating the various 
amendments to the Companies Act 1844 moved the rules on audited accounts into an 
appendix to the act laying down model articles that could be disapplied by the incorporators.
45
 
The 1856 Act introduced a number of other changes facilitating the formation of companies, 
allowed registration with the most basic information to be filed,
46
 and did not undertake to 
regulate primary market disclosure in any way. 
The amendments of 1847 and the Joint Stock Companies Act 1856 were said to have been 
adopted ‘in the heyday of laissez-faire’.47 While the Act of 1856 constituted the pinnacle of 
the deregulatory movement and subsequent amendments began to make careful alterations to 
the free market system, the main contours of the disclosure framework established by the two 
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Companies Acts remained in place until 1900.
48
 The only noteworthy amendment during this 
period was brought about by the Companies Act 1867, which reintroduced the term 
‘prospectus’ and required that prospectuses had to set out the dates and names of all contracts 
entered into by the company, promoters, and directors before the issue of the prospectus.
49
 
However, the requirement to disclose contracts remained largely ineffective in practice 
because it could be evaded by including a so-called ‘waiver clause’ in the prospectus or in the 
form of application for shares.
50
 
The disclosure regime was somewhat strengthened by the rules and regulations of the London 
Stock Exchange.
51
 The quotation of companies in the official list required, inter alia, that a 
prospectus was published that was in agreement with the articles of association, and that both 
the prospectus and the articles were filed with the stock exchange.
52
 However, the stock 
exchange rules did not seek to provide for a comprehensive disclosure regime supplanting the 
Companies Act and filling the void left by the legislator. Rather, they operated within the 
ambit of the existing legislative framework and selectively amplified certain requirements in 
response to abusive practices that had appeared in the markets. Recurring problems during 
times of booms in company formations were the gross overvaluation of assets acquired by the 
company, and consequently the lack of any relation between the market value of the assets 
and the company’s valuation, and the allotment of a large proportion of the company’s shares 
to the promoters or their nominees, who disposed of them at a premium in the secondary 
market without having made any payments on the shares.
53
 The stock exchange regulations 
sought to address these problems by requiring that a meaningful fraction of the capital issued 
                                                     
48
 The requirement to publish audited accounts was reinstated in the Companies Act 1879, 42 & 43 
Vict., c. 76, s. 7, for banking corporations. 
49
 Companies Act 1867, 30 & 31 Vict., c. 131, s. 38. 
50
 (1888) Economist 177-178. With time, the courts saw waiver clauses increasingly critically, see for 
example Greenwood v Leather Shod Wheel Company [1900] 1 Ch. 421. 
51
 Contemporary discussions of the rules and regulations of the London Stock Exchange include 
Bertram O. Bircham and Frederick G.C. Morris, Public companies: a treatise on the law and practice 
relating to the formation and flotation of such joint companies limited by shares as invite the public to 
subscribe for their capital (E. Wilson 1911); B.E. Spencer Brodhurst, The Law and Practice of the 
Stock Exchange (W. Clowes 1897); Rudolph E. Melsheimer and Walter Laurence, The Law and 
Customs of the London Stock Exchange (H. Sweet 1879; further editions 1884, 1891, and 1905); 
Frederick J. Varley, Rules & Regulations of the Stock Exchange. With notes and references to decided 
cases (E. Wilson 1925). For more recent studies see Larry Neal and Lance Davis, ‘The evolution of the 
rules and regulations of the first emerging markets: the London, New York and Paris stock exchanges, 
1792–1914’ (2005) 45 Quarterly Review of Economics and Finance 296; Larry Neal, Lance Davis, and 
Eugene N. White, ‘How it all began: The rise of listing requirements on the London, Berlin, Paris, and 
New York Stock Exchanges’ (2003) 38 International Journal of Accounting 117. 
52
 Mihill Slaughter, Rules and Regulations for the Conduct of Business on the Stock Exchange (London 
Stock Exchange 1873), Rules 128-129. 
53
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was actually allotted and paid up, the contracts with the promoters were disclosed, and the 
articles of association contained certain further mechanisms designed to protect investors.
54
 
However, enforcing these requirements was difficult, and the regulations did not succeed in 
eliminating the grievances that concerned the public.
55
 
The binding legal regime was finally reformed by the Companies Act 1900,
56
 which adopted 
four amendments significantly affecting disclosure regulation. First, it re-established the 
registration requirement for prospectuses that had been abolished in 1847.
57
 Second, it defined 
prospectuses widely, but arguably not as widely as the 1844 Act, so as to capture any 
statement offering securities to the public.
58
 Third, it required more comprehensive 
disclosures in the prospectus, including the number and amount of shares issued for a 
consideration other than in cash and the consideration for which they were issued, 
incorporation expenses, underwriting commissions, material contracts, and related party 
transactions, defined as any interest of a director in property to be acquired by the company 
and compensation for services rendered in connection with the formation of the company.
59
 
Fourth, the provisions on external audits of the balance sheet were again made binding for all 
companies.
60
 
In conclusion, in both the UK and Germany, the disclosure regime was fragmentary during 
most of the 19
th
 century. The duty to draw up and publish a balance sheet was introduced in 
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the two countries together with the general incorporation statutes in 1844 and 1870, 
respectively. However, with a brief interval in the UK from 1844 to 1856, it was not 
supplemented by the requirement that the balance sheet had to be audited by external auditors. 
Some rules on prospectus disclosure can be found in the British company legislation as early 
as 1844, and the Companies Act 1867 contained a provision requiring the disclosure of pre-
incorporation contracts in the prospectus, but it is difficult to speak of a binding, 
comprehensive disclosure regime before the amendments of 1900. In Germany, prospectus 
disclosure was not addressed by the legislator until the adoption of the Stock Exchange Act of 
1896. The regulations of the stock exchanges, which were fairly detailed, filled the regulatory 
gap at least partly from the 1880s onwards. Thus, it can be said that with a time lag of about 
20 years, Germany introduced similar provisions to those in the UK, either in statutory law or 
through stock exchange regulations. The main difference was, and it is an important one, that 
the German prospectus requirement was linked to the application for admission to trading on 
a stock exchange, since it was imposed by the regulations of the stock exchanges and later the 
Stock Exchange Act, and not by general company legislation.
61
 The prospectus regime under 
the UK Companies Act 1900, on the other hand, applied to any communication to the public 
that was intended to attract subscriptions for securities. However, this difference emerged 
relatively late, in 1900, when the British capital markets were already well developed. 
SHIFTING PARADIGMS: LIABILITY FOR INCORRECT DISCLOSURES 
Germany 
In Germany, the liability of issuers and underwriters for incorrect market disclosures had been 
a controversial policy issue since the first joint stock corporations, mainly railways, started to 
offer securities to the public in greater numbers in the 1840s and 1850s. Until 1850, 28 
railways were incorporated in Prussia, more than any other type of company.
62
 They were 
financed through the issue of shares and debentures, and their securities quickly became the 
object of speculation.
63
 Three reasons of a legal nature explain the predominance of railway 
securities during the early decades of German capital markets and their attractiveness as a 
speculative investment. First, it was permitted to subscribe to the shares before authorisation 
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to incorporate had been granted.
64
 Second, in order to encourage the construction of further 
railway lines, the Prussian government guaranteed dividends and interest on railway securities 
and declared railway shares and debentures as suitable for the investment of money held in 
trust for wards.
65
 Third, as opposed to most other stock corporations, railways were able to 
issue bearer shares.
66
 These rules facilitated the raising of capital by railway corporations, but 
they also had the effect that a number of economically unviable companies were able to place 
their securities without great difficulties.
67
 The first attempt of the government to address this 
problem did not focus on improving disclosure and holding those liable who had made overly 
optimistic or incorrect statements, but on the increased use of concessions and prohibitions. A 
decree from 1844 provided that any offering of railway shares required authorisation by the 
minister of finance and time bargains in interim shares of railway corporations were 
prohibited.
68
 It has been observed that the undesired consequences of this decree were similar 
to the Bubble Act of 1720.
69
 Fearing that trading in railway securities would become all but 
impossible, many investors withdrew their capital, the stock market collapsed, and even 
reputable railway corporations faced problems in obtaining financing. 
In the next decade, another financial scandal, again about a railway company, provided the 
necessary impetus for a more nuanced policy discussion, an in-depth academic treatment of 
liability for misstatements to the market, and court decisions that sought to adjust common 
law principles in order to develop doctrines suitable for capital-market-specific problems.
70
 
The case, the so-called Lucca-Pistoia-Controversy, concerned an Italian railway corporation 
that had obtained a concession to construct a railway between Lucca and Pistoia in Tuscany. 
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The project was potentially highly profitable because the railway would connect two already 
existing lines. The company issued preference shares that were offered to the public in 
Germany by a Frankfurt-based banking institution in 1853. The bank published a prospectus 
that contained, among other information, the statement that annual ‘interest payments’ of 5% 
on the preference shares were backed by a guarantee of the government of Tuscany (more 
correctly a guaranteed dividend), without however mentioning that the railway’s concession, 
and hence also the guarantee, might be revoked if construction of the railway line was not 
completed within a specified period of time. In addition, the prospectus stated that ‘in light of 
information scrupulously collected by the bank a return of considerably more than 10% could 
be expected’.71 On the first day of the offering period, the issue was already three to four 
times oversubscribed and all shares were allotted. Because of events unrelated to the 
Frankfurt bank, in particular fraudulent acts of another underwriter and the ‘incompetence’ of 
the railway corporation’s directors, the completion of the railway line was delayed 
considerably, with the consequence that the government guarantee was forfeited and the 
shares depreciated greatly in value.
72
 
At the time of the controversy, different types of underwriting, comparable to best efforts and 
firm commitment underwriting, were already well developed.
73
 It was unclear in the case 
whether the Frankfurt bank was offering the securities as a seller in their own name or as an 
agent on behalf of the issuer, and the courts apparently interpreted the facts differently in this 
regard.
74
 If a contractual relationship did not exist between the investors and those responsible 
for the prospectus, investors had to rely mainly on the actio doli, which was somewhat 
comparable to the common law tort of deceit
75
 and required a showing of intent to defraud.
76
 
Even in cases where the investors purchased directly from the issuer of the prospectus, 
common law principles made it difficult for them to recover, but some courts in the Lucca-
Pistoia-proceedings interpreted traditional doctrines in a flexible way and held the Frankfurt 
bank liable, as will be discussed presently. 
It is interesting to compare the different points of reference that the courts and commentators 
used to analyse the liability of the bank. Some adopted what might be called a traditional 
sales-focused perspective: they discussed whether the object of the investment—the shares of 
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a railway corporation—were defective. Emphasising that the financial success of a railway 
line that was still under construction depended on various factors that might or might not be 
under the control of the railway corporation, and certainly not under the control of 
intermediaries, they argued that the seller of securities did not guarantee, and the buyer did 
not expect the seller to guarantee, that the investment would generate a specific return or the 
construction project would be completed within a specific timeframe. Thus, the expected 
return on investment mentioned in the offering prospectus of the Frankfurt bank, or the fact 
that the prospectus did not elaborate on the consequences of a delay in completing the 
construction of the railway for the government guarantee, did not give rise to claims by 
investors. ‘Evidently’, as one contemporary commentator pointed out, ‘Mr Goldschmidt [the 
underwriter] did not want to promise an unconditional interest guarantee to subscribers’.77 
Similarly, ‘all subscribers knew that they were purchasing shares of a railway still under 
construction and were, accordingly, running all the risks that the acquisition of such shares 
typically entails.’78 
The court of appeal in one of the ensuing proceedings seems to have been informed by this 
approach when it held that the statement of an expected return of more than 10% was mere 
‘sales promotion’, which was not actionable unless the calculations were made without any 
factual basis.
79
 However, at the same time, the court deviated from the conventional line of 
reasoning and adopted a disclosure-focused perspective with regard to the omitted conditions 
of the government guarantee. In the context of a traditional claim arising out of contract, the 
actio empti, according to which the seller is liable if the goods do not have the promised 
characteristics or the seller fraudulently (with dolus) conceals a defect,
80
 the court developed 
elements of a cause of action that were essentially not concerned with the quality of the 
securities, but with the completeness of the information contained in the prospectus. In this 
sense, the court’s analysis began to resemble modern prospectus liability claims. The court 
held that the cause of action required: first, an incorrect statement or omission; second, 
materiality of the misstatement or omission; and third that the defendant had knowingly 
concealed the true facts.
81
 The last condition resulted from the chosen cause of action, the 
actio empti. The claimant was therefore in a similar position to purchasers on the secondary 
market who could not bring a contractual claim against the issuer of the prospectus. If the 
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three conditions were satisfied, as was the case in the Lucca-Pistoia proceedings,
82
 the 
defendant bore the burden of proving that the claimant was aware of the misstatement at the 
time of the transaction.
83
 
Thus, we find the law in the 1850s at a transitory point. On the one hand, much of the legal 
analysis still used face-to-face transactions and the sale-of-goods paradigm as the relevant 
contextual framework. On the other hand, it was clear to the courts that the traditional legal 
principles were not calibrated well to address issues that arose when securities were offered to 
the public by means of a prospectus or a comparable publication inviting subscriptions. For 
this reason, the focus of the analysis shifted to the function performed by prospectuses: 
conditioning the market by conveying potentially selective information to the public. Of 
course, possible avenues of purchasers in the primary or secondary market to claim damages 
were still limited. Both types of investor generally had to show dolus, which implied that the 
issuer of the prospectus intended to deceive, and did deceive, the purchaser. The investor had 
to rely on the prospectus and had to be motivated by the misstatement or omission to enter 
into the transaction. In most cases, these requirements made it impossible for purchasers on 
the secondary market to bring a claim. In addition, they did not provide any incentive for 
those who drafted and published a prospectus to verify the information they had obtained 
about the issuer. The gatekeeper function of reputational intermediaries that is reinforced by 
the private enforcement machinery of modern securities regulation, therefore, was not utilized 
by these early attempts to formulate principles of prospectus liability.
84
 Nevertheless, the first 
steps towards a disclosure-focused conceptualisation of existing liability provisions were 
taken. 
In the following decades, the legal development continued down the path taken in the Lucca-
Pistoia-proceedings with incremental innovations. The amendments to the General German 
Commercial Code of 1884, which tightened the regulation of joint stock corporations in 
reaction to the perceived abuses of the freedom of incorporation after the abolishment of the 
concession system in 1870, introduced two provisions establishing liability of those who 
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made incorrect public statements in order to induce investors to subscribe for securities.
85
 
However, both provisions remained largely ineffectual. The first imposed liability on anyone 
who knew or, employing the care of a conscientious manager, should have known that an 
announcement offering shares to the public was incorrect or incomplete, but liability existed 
only in relation to the company and only for misstatements made within two years after 
incorporation regarding the capital structure of the company or the valuation of contributions 
in kind.
86
 The scope of the second provision was broader, capturing any incorrect statement in 
public announcements made to attract investments and any deceptive device employed to 
affect the stock market price of the company’s shares.87 However, since the provision was 
designed as a criminal offence, it sanctioned only intentional or fraudulent acts. 
The courts took recourse to a different, much older legal concept to develop the contours of 
prospectus liability in cases where fraud could not be shown and the investor had not bought 
from the issuer of the prospectus. In a leading case
88
 that involved an incorrect prospectus 
published in several newspapers by a promoter of the issuer and chairman of its supervisory 
board, the Imperial Court relied on the rules on advice and recommendations from the 
General Prussian Common Law adopted in the 18
th
 century,
89
 which provided for three types 
of liability: anyone was responsible for the consequences of knowingly incorrect statements 
or knowingly detrimental recommendations; experts who gave advice within their field of 
expertise were additionally liable for gross negligence; and finally, if they received 
remuneration for their advice, liability existed for any form of negligence.
90
  
The claimant in the case had bought shares from an intermediary in the primary market. He 
sought damages from the chairman of the supervisory board, arguing that he had relied on the 
prospectus in making the investment decision. The court qualified the offering prospectus as 
‘advice’ and a ‘recommendation’, since the prospectus contained information relevant to the 
determination of the value of an investment opportunity.
91
 Interestingly, the court was also 
prepared to accept without further discussion that the rules on advice and recommendations 
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applied to statements made to an undefined, potentially unlimited class of persons, such as 
investors in a public offering.
92
 It is unclear whether these principles would apply to 
purchasers in the aftermarket, or the court would inquire into the purpose of the offering 
prospectus.
93
 However, the decision indicates that at least purchasers in the primary market 
who read the incorrect prospectus and relied on it were entitled to claim damages for the loss 
suffered as a consequence of the investment, provided that the misstatement was made 
intentionally or, if the defendant was an expert, for example a banking institution, grossly 
negligently. Thus, the holding significantly facilitated recovery by investors compared with 
the legal situation presented above. However, the characterisation of the offering prospectus 
as advice or a recommendation remained controversial in the literature, and the law was not 
settled until the legislator stepped in to reform prospectus liability in 1896.
94
 
United Kingdom 
The evolution of a private cause of action for misstatements in the prospectus or other 
communications addressed to potential investors under English law has been described as 
‘haphazard’, with courts (and the legislature) reacting ‘to economic changes in an ad hoc, 
unsystematic way.’95 The need to determine the responsibility of promoters and directors for 
misrepresentations arose with the boom in company formations starting in the early 19
th
 
century. The years before the repeal of the Bubble Act in 1825
96
 saw a surge in company 
promotions and widespread speculation in shares.
97
 The boom ended abruptly in the second 
half of 1825 with a stock market crash, bank runs and a credit crunch that led to the failure of 
80% of the companies formed during the boom.
98
 Macroeconomic factors were most likely 
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the main contributing cause of the crisis.
99
 However, part of the blame falls on investors who 
were gripped by a speculative frenzy and invested in questionable ventures floated with 
minimal information
100
 and only a fraction of the legal capital paid up.
101
 It is, therefore, 
unsurprising that public opinion and the courts were initially not sympathetic to those who 
had lost their investment in the crash.
102
 The difficulties faced by investors were compounded 
by the fact that companies founded without royal charter were qualified as partnerships. An 
investor who had bought shares on the basis of a misleading prospectus and become a 
partner
103
 could not sue his fellow partners at common law, because that was seen as being 
tantamount to suing himself.
104
 Equity allowed the investor to petition the court to dissolve 
the partnership and take an account, but the courts were adamant that all partners had to be 
made parties to the suit, even if they numbered in the hundreds.
105
  
However, over the next decades, as company promotions became a more common 
phenomenon, the courts began to open up avenues to grant investors remedies at law and in 
equity if they subscribed for shares in a projected company that was presented as a well-
capitalised undertaking, but that was abandoned without having been incorporated by statute 
and without ever having operated.
106
 It is instructive to examine the approach of the courts in 
dealing with such cases. The common law courts, similar to the courts in Germany, assessed 
the subscription for shares primarily through the lens of a contract for the purchase of 
something with particular characteristics. They asked whether the investor had received what 
he had asked for: ‘shares in a practicable scheme’, i.e. in a concern with sufficient capital, to 
be raised by the issue of a specified number of shares.
107
 If that was not the case, if the 
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investor had instead ‘received shares in a scheme that was impracticable, and which was 
rendered so by the act of the [defendants] in refusing to allot more than [a fraction of the 
specified number of] shares,’108  there was a ‘failure of consideration’: ‘That which was 
allotted not being in truth that which the plaintiff had asked for, he was not bound to take 
it.’109  
Thus, the starting point of the courts’ analysis was not the act of disclosing incorrect 
information, but the variance between the promised and the actual characteristics of the 
projected undertaking and hence, by extension, of the acquired securities. The courts did not 
yet appreciate that disclosure played a different role in impersonal markets than in face-to-
face transactions and that it might be necessary, therefore, to develop distinct regulatory 
concepts regarding the former. It has been pointed out that the courts were not guided by 
general principles informed, for example, by the goal of investor protection or the efficiency 
of price formation. Rather, that ‘the question of liability for failed enterprise depended on a 
number of factors to be seen case by case—whether there had been fraud, what contract the 
allottee had signed, how much authority directors were given.’110 
Variance between the promised and the actual characteristics of the scheme did not end the 
inquiry if the investor had entered into a binding subscription agreement authorising the 
directors to use the deposits for expenses incurred in the formation of the business. An action 
for money had and received would fail unless the plaintiff was able to show that the 
misrepresentation was fraudulent and that it had been a material inducement to the investor to 
subscribe for the shares.
111
 This was by no means impossible in cases where the projected 
company had to be abandoned because it was undercapitalised and the directors had sought to 
enrich themselves through the allotment of shares to themselves. However, where the 
company had been set up as a viable undertaking and had operated for some time, this 
approach made it difficult to hold the managers accountable for misstatements, for example 
overly optimistic financial reports. The investors could take recourse to an action for deceit, 
but it was generally agreed that in order to sustain such an action they had to prove that the 
defendants made representations to the investors
112
 that were materially false, they knew that 
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the statements were not true (or did not believe in their truth), intended the plaintiffs to act on 
them, and the plaintiffs did act on the misstatement.
113
  
In equity, the courts came to the same conclusion. If the plaintiffs were entitled to relief at law 
in an action for money had and received because of fraudulent misstatements
114
 or because 
they had invested in a ‘bubble company’, a scheme that was abandoned before it was fully 
incorporated, courts of equity held that the investors could recover their deposits from those 
who had published the misleading prospectus or made the misrepresentations.
115
 
Courts started to make careful alterations to the above concepts that were more 
accommodating to investors who had bought shares in reliance on a misleading prospectus 
during the second half of the century. The notion of the company as an entity clearly distinct 
from its shareholders became embedded in legal reasoning with the reforms introduced by the 
Limited Liability Act 1855
116
 and the Joint Stock Companies Act 1856,
117
 which simplified 
the process of registration and replaced the deed of settlement with the memorandum and 
articles of association. At the same time, it became more common for the middle class to 
invest in the capital markets. The economy was increasingly characterised by the paradigm of 
the passive investor who took shares in a professionally managed company.
118
 Therefore, it 
was less natural to draw an analogy with the business form of the partnership and assume that 
third parties traded with the company on the faith that those who were held out as 
shareholders indeed possessed that quality.
119
 
As a consequence, we now find decisions that allowed rescission of the share purchase 
agreement in cases falling short of a fraudulent misrepresentation. In 1869, in the wake of 
another boom in company formations and another stock market crash, the House of Lords 
held in a landmark decisions that investors were entitled to rescind if they had been induced 
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to purchase the shares on the misrepresentation of a material fact,
120
 even if the directors had 
not been aware of the untruth of the statements and had not acted fraudulently.
121
 It is possible 
to discern a change in the courts’ reasoning at this juncture. The courts recognised that the 
prospectus functioned as an instrument that alleviated the informational disadvantage of 
investors. They emphasised that ‘the shareholders had not the means afforded to them of 
forming an independent judgment on [the] subject [of the likely return on their 
investment].’ 122  A first corollary of the recognition of the informational function of 
prospectuses was the imposition of more stringent duties on directors. Investors were entitled 
to assume that the directors, ‘as men of character and honour, knew to be true that which 
[they] stated’,123 and the law accordingly held them responsible if they made misstatements in 
prospectuses in ignorance of their truth or untruth. A second corollary was the 
acknowledgement that misrepresentations did not affect the purchased shares themselves. 
They did not constitute a defect of the shares that diminished their value in the hands of the 
initial allottee as well as buyers in the secondary market.
124
 Rather, the question was whether 
the buyer was a member of the circle of persons whom the misrepresentation was intended to 
influence or, to put it differently, whether the communication was directed at the market in 
which the buyer was operating.
125
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Thus, we can identify in Britain a paradigm shift similar to the one that occurred in Germany 
at about the same time. Courts relied less on legal concepts and arguments designed to 
regulated face-to-face transactions. Instead, they paid increasing attention to the role that 
information played in impersonal markets and recognised the need to reformulate and modify 
traditional regulatory concepts. Nevertheless, to hold that this conceptual shift protected 
investors comprehensively against misrepresentations would be an overstatement. 
Shareholders had a duty to use all reasonable diligence in ascertaining that the relevant 
representations were correct and, if found to be incorrect, exercise their right to rescind the 
contract within a reasonable time and certainly before the winding-up of the company 
commenced.
126
 In addition, even if a fraud had been committed that was imputable to the 
company,
127
 the courts generally denied the shareholders the right to sue the company itself 
for damages.
128
 
In many cases, therefore, the only remedy available to investors was a direct action against 
the directors who had issued the misleading statement. In some decisions from the 1860s, the 
courts had made sweeping statements that seemed to anticipate a sea change in how 
misleading disclosures were regulated. While these statements stemmed from decisions 
dealing with actions for rescission, they implied that directors might be held accountable not 
only for fraudulent, but also for negligent misrepresentations.
129
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In Derry v Peek,
130
 the leading case on common law prospectus liability until Hedley Byrne v 
Heller
131
 introduced the tort of negligent misrepresentation, the Court of Appeal emulated this 
approach.
132
 The case concerned an undertaking incorporated to operate a tramway, whose 
offering prospectus stated that the company had obtained the permission to use steam-
powered carriages. The permission had in fact not yet been granted unconditionally, and when 
the Board of Trade refused the necessary consent, the company had to be wound up. At trial, 
evidence was given that the directors had been confident that consent would be given and that 
they had not acted with intent to defraud the investors. The question was, therefore, what 
degree of ‘moral culpability’ was required in an action of deceit: dishonesty, or whether it 
was sufficient that the defendant made a false statement carelessly but honestly. The Court of 
Appeal held that the latter was the case. A director or other person who ‘makes statements 
which he desires that others should act upon … [is subject to a duty] to take care that he has 
reasonable ground for the material statements which are contained in that document which he 
prepares and circulates’.133 If the statements are made without exercising the necessary care to 
ascertain that they are correct, the director ‘is liable civilly as much as a person who commits 
what is usually called fraud, and tells an untruth knowing it to be an untruth.’134 These were 
far-ranging pronouncements. The justices were, of course, well aware that the law on this 
point was not settled and that it was not easy to reconcile their interpretation with some of the 
applicable precedents.
135
 That they were willing to extend the notion of deceit to behaviour 
lacking dishonesty shows the unease that existed at the time about the legal mechanisms 
available to regulate public offerings and protect investors representing increasingly broad 
and varied sections of society.
136
 
The House of Lords, however, was not prepared to take the same leap. It overruled the 
decision of the Court of Appeal and made it clear that the claimant in an action of deceit must 
prove actual fraud. Fraud was held to require a showing ‘that a false representation has been 
made (1) knowingly, or (2) without belief in its truth, or (3) recklessly, careless whether it be 
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true or false.’137 Thus, a statement, even if made without reasonable ground for believing it, 
will not necessarily give rise to liability, provided that it was ‘made honestly, and in the full 
belief that it was true’.138 This decision, if read together with Peek v Gurney, where it was 
held that offering prospectuses were only addressed to the original allottees,
139
 made it almost 
impossible for purchasers in the aftermarket and very difficult for the original subscribers to 
claim compensation for misstatements in the offering prospectus. Similar to the situation in 
Germany, the law had reached a point where the courts had introduced certain innovations in 
response to changing economic conditions, but traditional legal doctrines displayed 
considerable inertia. In particular, the century-old institutions of deceit and actio doli 
channelled legal reasoning in ways that made it difficult for the courts to innovate where 
innovation was needed most: in modifying the requirement that investors show dishonesty on 
the part of the directors. More was needed, but in both countries, legal mechanisms that were 
more finely calibrated to take account of the function of prospectuses and the informational 
asymmetry between investors and issuers were only introduced towards the end of the century 
in the form of codified prospectus liability provisions.
140
 These mechanisms, as well, did not 
prove effective in either country, because the threshold for recovery by investors continued to 
be high.
141
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DIVERGING PATHS: FORMATION LAW 
Germany: ‘Investing in shares is always risky’142 
As we have seen, disclosure was used in both Germany and the United Kingdom as a 
substitute mechanism for the lack of state control when the concession system was replaced 
with a system of incorporation by registration. In both countries, disclosure obligations were 
relatively fragmentary and did not impose undue regulatory burdens on companies. The same 
could be said initially about the formation regimes that applied under the newly introduced 
liberalised laws. The steps that had to be taken pursuant to the German Companies Act of 
1870
143
 to establish a company were simple. The act required the drawing up, filing and 
publication of the memorandum of association with a specified content;
144
 the filing of 
additional information with the registrar of companies confirming, inter alia, that all of the 
company’s share capital had been subscribed and at least ten percent of the amount owed by 
the shareholders was paid up;
145
 and the registration of the company.
146
 Considerations in kind 
were permissible without independent valuation;
147
 minimum par value was fixed at a level 
that was lower than under the previous Prussian legislation, while not being insignificantly 
low;
148
 and the act left considerable scope for contractual freedom in fashioning the 
company’s governance architecture. 
This regime was reformed fundamentally in the wake of the financial crisis of 1873.
149
 
Interestingly, even though the events of 1873 can be considered the first major stock 
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exchange crash in Germany, the legislator reacted initially with circumspection. The Higher 
Commercial Court of the Reich in its study of 1877 took pains to emphasise that the 
fraudulent and speculative practices were not primarily a consequence of the Companies Act 
of 1870, the basic principles of which the Court found to be sound, but of the credulity of the 
public and their naïve faith in indefinitely rising stock prices and sustained economic 
growth.
150
 The Federal Council of the Reich also cautioned that it was not advisable to engage 
in legislative activity while public opinion was still affected by the recent crisis and pointed 
out that existing legal mechanisms were sufficient to address abuses if applied forcefully.
151
 
Nevertheless, a few years later the Federal Council, mainly upon the instigation of Prussia 
and against the opposition of the more liberal northern German states, resolved to suggest a 
comprehensive reform of the 1870 Act.
152
 The ministry of justice did not pursue the reforms 
as a high priority. It was of the view that the excesses of the Gründerzeit, the years after the 
abolishment of the concession system, had abated and the effects of any legislative reform on 
the system of free enterprise that had been ushered in by the 1870 Act should be considered 
carefully before any concrete steps were taken.
153
 Eventually, however, the government 
produced a draft law
154
 that was adopted with some amendments in 1884,
155
 in spite of 
attracting fierce criticism from both conservative and liberal circles.
156
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The policy goals of the reform were twofold: The act sought to strengthen the position of 
investors and protect them against the rapid, and at times fraudulent, incorporation of 
companies that did not always carry on a viable business. At the same time, the law pursued 
somewhat diffuse macroeconomic goals. It was believed that the incorporation of a large 
number of companies gave rise to overproduction and that the law should ensure that only 
socially useful firms were incorporated.
157
 On the other hand, the legislator acknowledged 
that it could not be the role of the law to differentiate between economically productive and 
less productive uses of the corporate form.
158
 Instead of imposing some form of merit 
requirements, the legislator pursued the reform goals, inter alia, by introducing higher 
minimum legal capital requirements and more stringent rules on capital contributions.
159
 
First, and most importantly, the minimum par value of shares was increased to 1,000 
marks.
160
 This increase was explicitly seen as a central investor protection mechanism and 
shows the paternalistic nature of the reform. While the policy makers recognized that only the 
investor’s vigilance could protect effectively against deceit and improvidence, 161  they 
evidently did not have much faith in the ability of the ‘small investor’ (the ‘kleine Mann’ or 
‘kleine Kapitalist’) to assess the value of an investment opportunity. The legislative 
memorandum accompanying the 1884 Act explained that the savings of this class of 
investors, ‘acquired laboriously and constituting maybe their only assets after long years of 
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work’, should be placed in save investments, such as government bonds or interests in 
cooperatives. The small savers should, accordingly, be prevented from accessing the capital 
markets altogether.
162
 Further, the legislator expected the high nominal value to have a 
salutary effect on the conduct of sophisticated investors as well. Because of the larger sums 
invested, the investors would be incentivized to participate more actively in the affairs of the 
company, and the general meeting, consisting of a less widely dispersed body of shareholders, 
would become a more effective control organ.
163
 
Second, registration of the company required that all shares were subscribed and, in the case 
of contributions in cash, at least one fourth of the nominal value and the premium in full be 
paid up.
164
 The subscribers were not allowed to set off their obligations against any claims 
they might have against the company.
165
 Share certificates could be issued only after the 
shares had been paid up in full, and interim certificates issued to bearer were prohibited.
166
 
The subscribers and all subsequent acquirers of shares were liable to the company for any 
amount outstanding on the shares.
167
 If contributions were made in kind, the founders had to 
sign a declaration setting out why the shares constituted, in their view, adequate 
consideration.
168
 The members of the management and supervisory board had to verify 
compliance of the formation process with the legal requirements. In addition, in some cases, 
the law prescribed an external valuation, in particular where the members of the management 
or supervisory board were also the founders or had transferred property to the company.
169
 
Finally, the 1884 Act imposed joint and several civil liability and criminal sanctions on 
founders and directors who made incorrect statements about subscriptions or contributions, 
for example if they overstated the value of a contribution in kind or declared that the nominal 
value and premium had been paid up, where this was not in fact the case.
170
 Importantly, the 
law shifted the burden of proof for civil responsibility to the founders, who had to show that 
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they did not know and, exercising the care of a reasonably diligent businessman, could not 
have known that the relevant declaration was incorrect or incomplete.
171
  
These amendments tackled directly what were perceived to be the most egregious defects of 
the Companies Act of 1870. The old law had not envisaged any external control of the 
formation process or the valuation of contributions in kind, with the consequence that the 
founders had often enriched themselves to the detriment of outside investors and creditors, 
and the capital had not been paid up.
172
 Another problem highlighted by the reform was the 
fact that subscribers had been only liable for 40% of the nominal value of the shares, and the 
company could be given authority in the articles to release the shareholders from the 
remainder of their obligations.
173
 This authority was intended as an exceptional provision, but 
it was observed that it had become the rule in practice and had been used widely in order to 
release subscribers in situations where the shares had lost much of their value.
174
 
United Kingdom: ‘I am arguing in favour of human liberty’175 
In contrast to Germany, the UK formation regime remained relatively stable since the 
introduction of incorporation by registration in 1844,
176
 in spite of several financial crisis and 
scandals that occurred over the course of the 19
th
 century. The Act of 1844 established a 
registrar of joint stock companies and required only the filing of certain particulars for the 
formation of companies.
177
 It further set out the rights and powers of the shareholders and 
directors, including rules on related-party transactions,
178
 and contained detailed provisions on 
the company’s books and records.179 On the other hand, the company’s capital structure was 
only lightly regulated. The act did not provide for any minimum legal capital or minimum 
nominal value of the shares. Shareholders could make their contributions in cash or kind. The 
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act required disclosure of the nature and value of the contribution, but in-kind contributions 
did not need to be valued independently.
180
 
In spite of its progressive nature, the 1844 Act was not seen as unambiguously successful, 
especially because it did not resolve the problem of how to limit the liability of investors who 
had neither the incentive nor the ability to supervise the company’s management.181 This 
question triggered an intense public debate about the advantages and risks of limited 
liability,
182
 which was eventually resolved in favour of introducing limited liability with the 
adoption of the Limited Liability Act of 1855.
183
 The act sought to chart a careful course 
between those who championed limited liability as a central tenet of free enterprise and 
economic development, and those who were concerned that it would encourage improper 
speculation. The act provided for several safeguards designed to protect creditors and the 
public in general, notably by requiring that shares were of a nominal value of not less than ten 
pounds, at least three fourths of the nominal capital was subscribed, and shareholders had 
paid up at least 20% of the subscribed amount before registration, which was to be attested by 
a statutory declaration of the promoters.
184
 In addition, the act introduced certain capital 
maintenance requirements. The directors were jointly and severally liable for the debts of the 
company if they paid out dividends knowing that the company was insolvent
185
 and the 
company had to be wound up if three fourths of the subscribed capital was lost.
186
 Finally, 
appointment of at least one auditor required approval of the Board of Trade.
187
 
The Limited Liability Act 1855 was revoked less than a year after its enactment, together with 
the Act of 1844 and other amending acts, and the law was consolidated by the Joint Stock 
Companies Act 1856.
188
 This act, more than any other, was influenced by the ideas of laissez-
faire.
189
 It simplified the process of registration and moved a number of previously mandatory 
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provisions to the model articles of association.
190
 Freedom of contract was, therefore, 
accorded a salient role in the formation of companies. The safeguards that the Limited 
Liability Act 1855 had stipulated as the ‘price’ of limited liability were repealed almost in 
their entirety.
191
 The 1856 Act did not prescribe a minimum nominal value of shares, a 
minimum percentage of the subscribed capital to be paid up, or any statutory declaration of 
the promoters as to the paid-up amount. The binding part of the act contained only two 
provisions on capital requirements and capital maintenance, apart from rules mandating 
disclosure. The directors were still liable for dividend payments made in knowledge of the 
company’s insolvency192 and the loss of three fourths of the company’s capital entailed its 
winding up.
193
 
The two other main companies acts that were adopted until 1913, the Companies Act 1862
194
 
and the Companies (Consolidation) Act 1908,
195
 as well as their various amending acts, left 
the main system of incorporation and registration established by the 1856 Act intact. The 
successive acts introduced new distinctions, for example between private and public 
companies,
196
 and the rules became more detailed, but incorporation continued to be regulated 
in a permissive manner, requiring simply the filing of the memorandum of association.
197
 
Further rules governing the raising of capital were not very onerous, and the risk of liability 
for promoters and subscribers was limited. Amendments merely stipulated that the minimum 
amount payable before allotment should not be less than five percent
198
 and the amount paid 
in cash or the nominal value of the shares allotted against contributions in kind, and any 
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contract of sale or for services regarding contributions in kind, should be filed with the 
registrar.
199
 
This lenient approach was confirmed by case law. The courts utilized general principles of 
company law, namely the ultra vires doctrine, to decide that a company had no power to issue 
shares as fully paid-up without receiving consideration equivalent to the nominal value of the 
shares.
200
 If consideration is given in kind, the question, of course, becomes how to value the 
contribution to ascertain whether it is ‘equivalent’ to the nominal value of the shares issued. 
In the famous case In Re Wragg, where property given in consideration for shares was 
overstated by about 80%,
201
 it was held that a court would not go behind the contract and 
examine whether the consideration was valued correctly unless the claimant showed fraud: 
‘Provided a limited company does so honestly and not colourably, … agreements by limited 
companies to pay for property or services in paid-up shares are valid and binding on the 
companies and their creditors’.202 The reasoning of the Court of Appeal makes it clear that, 
save in exceptional circumstances,
203
 the courts will not interfere with entrepreneurial activity 
or substitute their own judgment for that of the market actors in business matters: 
It is not law that persons cannot sell property to a limited company for fully paid-
up shares and make a profit by the transaction. We must not allow ourselves to be 
misled by talking of value. The value paid to the company is measured by the 
price at which the company agrees to buy what it thinks it worth its while to 
acquire. Whilst the transaction is unimpeached, this is the only value to be 
considered.
204
 
The courts were, of course, aware of the conflict of interest that characterises transactions in 
which shareholders transfer property or render services to the company for fully paid-up 
shares.
205
 But they acknowledged that the law as it stood did not impose any constraints on 
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such transactions, and the only mechanism to protect the public was the requirement to 
register the agreement between the company and the shareholder.
206
 
The importance of formation law 
The German reforms of 1884 had a clear effect on the ease of formation of joint stock 
corporations. As intended by the legislator, the high minimum par value of shares effectively 
excluded a large proportion of the population from subscribing to equity issues. An 
examination of the income distribution in Germany at the time may serve to illustrate the 
impact of the nominal value requirement. According to Prussian income tax data from 1881, 
72.54% of all taxpayers had an annual income of 660 marks or less, 21.41% an income of 
661-1,500 marks, 4.11% earned 1,501-3,000 marks, and 1.94% more than 3,000 marks.
207
 
Even if these figures are increased by one quarter to control for underreporting, as suggested 
by some contemporary commentators, 45.07% of taxpayers had an average annual income of 
647 marks, a further 37.63% an average income of 1,536.3 marks, and the remaining 17.3% 
an average income of 9,271.1 marks.
208
 
The strict rules on formation and capital contributions made incorporations more costly, 
particularly by requiring an external audit in specified cases, and entailed a higher risk of 
liability for founders and others involved in the formation process. It is, therefore, reasonable 
to assume that the joint stock corporation became comparatively less attractive as a legal 
vehicle to pursue business operations, and the stock market less relevant for the raising of 
finance. Indeed, while incorporations did not decrease in absolute numbers,
209
 they decreased 
in relative terms.
210
 In addition, it has been observed that the ownership structure of 
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companies changed. Banks and industrial corporations became more important as providers 
of equity capital, and as a result economic concentration increased.
211
 For small and medium-
sized enterprises, the form of the public stock corporation was not suitable, and demands for a 
less onerous regulatory framework were voiced.
212
 These calls were heeded in 1892 with the 
adoption of the law on the limited liability company, which provided for a form of business 
association benefitting from limited liability without the demanding formation regime of the 
public stock corporation, and which placed greater emphasis on contractual freedom in 
shaping the governance structure of the company.
213
 On the other hand, the design of the 
limited liability company’s share capital prevented the founders from offering shares to the 
public or trading them on capital markets,
214
 thus forcing an important subset of German 
industrial enterprises to take recourse to other forms of financing, especially retained earnings 
and bank loans. 
A comparison of the diffusion of German public stock corporations with that of their 
counterparts in other European countries also highlights the different path that the German 
corporate landscape had taken by the end of the 19
th
 century. The number of joint stock 
companies incorporated in Germany was relatively low, around 5,000 at the turn of the 
century with an aggregate paid-up capital of 685 million pounds sterling,
215
 compared with 
more than 40,000 in the UK with an aggregate capital of 2,000 million pounds sterling.
216
 On 
the other hand, the average capital of a German corporation was almost three times higher 
than that of UK companies and in fact higher than in any other European country except 
Austria and Russia.
217
 The considerably larger number of smaller incorporated businesses in 
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the UK can of course be explained with the fact that the figures comprise both what we would 
now call public and private companies. However, arguably, this does not detract from the 
significance of the comparison. A formal distinction between private and public companies 
was introduced into English company law only in 1907,
218
 and private companies could be 
transformed into public companies relatively easily by passing a special resolution to this 
effect and filing a statement in lieu of prospectus with the registrar.
219
 The importance of the 
German amendments can be seen in the decision to condition access to the capital markets not 
on compliance with particular disclosure obligations, such as the publication of a prospectus 
or statement in lieu of prospectus, but on the implementation of a capital structure 
fundamentally different from, and more costly than, that of other forms of business 
association. The legislator of 1884 was conscious of the choice between more stringent 
transparency requirements and a more demanding formation regime. The lawmakers 
discussed the English regulatory approach centred on a document informing the public in a 
fairly detailed manner about the company and the offering, which they referred to as 
‘prospectus theory’, and rejected it because they believed the repetition of past financial 
scandals could only be avoided if the solidity of corporate issuers, and hence their capital 
structure, were improved.
220
 The formation regime thus adopted, it is submitted, represents 
the main difference between the German and British regulatory environment. It had far-
reaching ramifications for the development of the corporate landscape in Germany that 
continue to be felt to this day, as a significant section of economic activity is pursued in the 
form of the limited liability company, which is effectively excluded from the equity capital 
markets, and the public stock corporation was reserved for large, capital intensive 
undertakings.
221
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CONCLUSION 
A tentative answer to the question whether ‘law matters’222 for financial development may 
refer to the above analysis in order to point out that the identification of channels of influence 
requires a granular analysis of individual legal institutions, and that these channels are likely 
to be very different for different legal mechanisms. As far as the two countries and the period 
examined here are concerned, certain patterns emerge. There is no evidence that Britain’s 
capital markets were more developed because British investors were ‘armed … with the best 
information possessed by investors anywhere’223 and because they had more effective liability 
provisions at their disposal. In both countries, the level of disclosure regulation was broadly 
comparable, and in both countries it evolved incrementally and as a response to changing 
market conditions. Over the course of the 19
th
 century, the offering prospectus was re-
conceptualised as a tool to ensure market transparency, rather than a communication with the 
sole purpose of announcing the establishment of a company and selling shares in that 
company. Similarly, incorrect disclosures were gradually no longer assessed through a sale-
of-goods and failure-of-consideration lens. Instead, the courts focused on the market-
conditioning function of prospectuses and asked whether facts that were material to an 
informed investment decision were omitted or presented incorrectly.
224
 
The developmental path of formation law was fundamentally different. It was aligned in both 
countries only until 1884, when Germany left the path of liberal reform that it had followed 
since the abolishment of the concession system and introduced a stringent set of capital 
requirements. Furthermore, regulatory reform in this area was characterised not so much by 
incremental evolution as by comprehensive legislative packages that were intended to place 
the corporate economy on a substantially reformed regulatory footing, first in 1844 (in the 
case of the UK) and 1870 (Germany) through introduction of a system of registration by 
incorporation, and then in 1856 (UK) and 1884 (Germany) by respectively liberalising and 
restricting the applicable regime and organisational choice. 
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It is a question for future research whether these findings can be generalised. In order to do 
so, it would be necessary to extend the analysis to other potentially explanatory legal and non-
legal factors, and it would be worth exploring whether and how patterns of mutual influence 
between law and finance change over longer periods of time and in other countries. In any 
case, we can already conclude, as opposed to what has been argued in the literature,
225
 that 
there is no reason to assume that the common law is inherently superior in providing for a 
regulatory environment conducive to financial development. As we have seen, a regulatory 
‘superstructure’ dealing with market transparency emerged in both the United Kingdom and 
Germany in the 19
th
 century in similar forms. The divergence in the menu of organisational 
choice available for doing business, on the other hand, cannot be attributed to characteristics 
of common law or civil law, but the prevalent political climate of the day and the balance of 
market-liberal and conservative political forces in the relevant decision-making bodies.
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